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THE DEFENCE INDUSTRY HAS BEEN one of the industries most seriously affected by the
Russian economic crisis since 1992. The main restructuring policy applied in the
industry during the first years of transition was conversion, that is, trying to re-use
military resources for productive civil ends. By the mid-1990s, however, such a
policy was already considered a failure, and since 1997 the Ministry of Economy has
taken over the running of the defence industry and changed the direction of reform.
In the summer of 1999 the responsibility for the running of the defence industry was
transferred to five independent agencies, and this remains the situation. From 1997 the
aim was still to restructure the defence industry, but by using arms production itself
as a fundamental reference point.
As in any country which is a massive arms producer, in Russia the existence of the
defence industry is essentially conditioned by the supply of arms for internal use to
cover the country’s security needs. This is why any role arms exports could play,
compared with the restructuring of the defence industry, has traditionally been
overlooked. Specifically, when defence exports have been analysed, they have either
been considered as a commercial flow or as a matter of international security, owing
to the destination to which the arms have been sent. Scant attention has been paid,
however, to the aspect of arms production itself as a factor which stimulates the
defence industry’s economic activity. This last point of view is more relevant as we
consider the drop in production suffered by the Russian defence industry and,
specifically, the fall in the domestic demand for weapons.
The aim of this article is to analyse the role of arms exports in the restructuring of
the Russian defence industry. In particular, it tries to show, on one hand, whether
there has been a policy related to arms exports that helped the restructuring of the
defence industry and, on the other, whether arms exports have had or are having any
impact on its restructuring.
In the following section the methodology used for the analysis will be established
and then the main results related to weapons exports will be set out, in overall terms,
client-by-client and product-by-product. Next, the impact the export policy has had on
the defence industry will be explained, and finally, conclusions will be drawn as to
the restrictions imposed by the exporting of weapons on the future design of the
Russian defence industry and, therefore, on the arms production necessary to satisfy
internal demands.
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Methodology
This study analyses Russia’s exports between 1992 and 2000, this corresponding to
the El’tsin period, though also including the year 2000, which was essentially
influenced by decisions taken earlier. The analysis concentrates on the specific export
orders, especially the larger ones, and uses as its basis information made available in
annuals published by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).1
This information is filtered to eliminate any repetition or even orders not in the end
completed. This is then supplemented with information from the International
Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS),2 as well as from some Russian sources, either
semi-official or unofficial (Russian press). Next, only the weapons produced to be
exported are considered, and not those coming from the Russian army, because the
latter have no important implications for the defence industry. The exception to this
is when those weapons are modernised before being sold, but these are small-scale
modifications with a minimal impact on the activity of the companies in the defence
industry.
The information base is made up of 459 export deals which have been completed,
wholly or partly, since 1992. Of these, 73 comprise sales of Russian army weapons,
which is to say they had been produced earlier (and are left out of the analysis), while
386 are directly related to arms manufacture. These are the really relevant ones for
the defence industry as they increase the production rate in the sector. Nevertheless,
from within this group of exports, those contracts signed before 1992 must be taken
into separate consideration as they derive from the workings of Soviet policy3 and,
although they have generated economic activity in the defence organisations during
the period under consideration, their future impact on the rebuilding of the military
industrial network is arguable, This group of contracts includes 76 export orders. The
rest of the transactions, that is to say 310, were agreed between 1992 and 2000 and
some have yet to be completed. Owing to the change brought about in March 1997
when the Ministry of the Defence Industry was eliminated and the responsibility for
restructuring the industry was taken over by the Ministry of Economy, this period is
subdivided into two phases: 1992–97, with 240 export contracts, and 1998–2000, with
70 contracts.
Additionally, it must be made clear that such orders include two types of export
contracts, sales of weapons and the granting of production licences. As only 28
examples of this last type of contract have been recorded, it can be seen that they
make up a very small proportion and also their impact on the sector is very arguable,
as any quantity of financing they may signify is relatively modest. During the first
period under consideration there were 19 production permits (contracts signed before
1992 but carried out, at least in part, afterwards), whereas in 1992–97 there were only
five and in 1998–2000 only four registered concessions appear.4
The results of this analysis of Russian arms exports will be set out in two parts.
First, an overall analysis of the exports will be carried out and this activity will be
situated within the pattern of growth or contraction of the defence industry. Then the
study will be completed by highlighting the clients (geographical areas and countries)
and the products (types of weapons). In the second part, using this product infor-
mation, the weapon manufacturing companies are set out. In this regard an ad hoc
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defence company data base has been put together with special emphasis placed on the
type of arms production. With this information, a list of the most important export
companies has been obtained. Then, using the way the sales evolved during the nine
years that make up the reference period, some conclusions will be drawn as to the use
of arms exports as a tool for restructuring the defence industry. Additionally, the
results will show which companies have been the most active exporters, something
that will have allowed them for the most part to continue working actively and
maintain their production infrastructure, thus enabling them to form the foundations
of the future restructuring of the defence industry and the development of new
priorities in arms production.
Arms exports in Russia
Overall view
Throughout the 1990s the defence industry was one of the sectors of the Russian
economy most seriously affected by the economic crisis. During the first half of the
decade the drop in output in the industry was very marked and reached its lowest
point in 1998, when production only made up 19.2% of the 1991 level. Although this
drop in output was the result of a contraction as much in civilian as in military
production, it was the military side which was most seriously affected by the crisis
and, indeed, in 1997–98 the level of military production was less than 10% of that
reached in 1991. This production drop was even more serious if two factors are taken
into account. First, it was military production which made up the greater part of the
industry’s economic activity, and second, it was an integration mechanism for the
civilian production.5 The drop in civilian production was also a very marked one and
lasted until 1998, when this activity made up 26.5% of the level reached in 1991. The
fact that the drop was on such a scale was partly due to the failure of the conversion
process.6 So, although the civilian production level dropped less than the military and
has even shown itself to be more dynamic, during the period under consideration its
impact on the main activity of the defence organisations was rather a secondary one.7
Two types of production can be distinguished within the military activity which
characterises the defence industry: that destined for internal use and exports. Both
explain the drop in overall military production, but it is the great reduction in
domestic military procurements that determines the trend in military production. That
said, arms exports also fell notably. Whereas at the end of the 1980s Russian exports
came to a figure greater than $14 billion a year,8 in 1992 they came to only $2.5
billion and during the rest of the 1990s $3.5 billion was the highest annual figure
reached. Nevertheless, the export of arms began to play a prominent role for the
defence industry, as it allowed the upkeep and continued development of part of the
most important economic activity and gave significance to the industry’s organisa-
tions. This becomes obvious on seeing the importance arms exports have in the total
military production within the industry (domestic orders plus exports). At its lowest
point, this percentage was 41.3% in 1994 and at its highest, 80.7% in 2000. During
the period under consideration it has made up, at least, around 60% of total military
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production. Therefore, owing to the modest volume of domestic military procure-
ments, exports have played a vital role in the defence industry.
However, it is worth pointing out that exports played an even more important role
if two other factors are taken into account: the arrears on state payments for
completed military orders and the purchasing power associated with the possession of
or the ability to obtain foreign currency. As regards the first point, during the 1990s
the arrears on state payments came to a figure equivalent to domestic military
procurements themselves. In 1996, for example, the accumulated arrears made up
nearly half the value of the domestic military procurements accumulated since 1992
and were greater than the orders completed that year. In 1999 they represented a third
of the internal military orders accumulated until that year.9 The accumulation of
arrears led to the defence organisations losing interest in gaining military orders from
the state, at the same time as there was a reduction in the impact domestic
procurements had on the output of the defence industry. This last point is related to
the fact that, despite receiving orders from the state, many companies were in no
position to complete them owing to the cumulative deterioration of the economy and
so carried out the orders inefficiently. On the other hand, given the scarcity of cash,
the ability to export represented a revaluation of the activity itself (in this case,
exporting) that also allowed payments to be made in cash and thus brought access to
goods and services that could only be acquired with money.
These aspects point to the fact that exports represented something very important
for the defence industry. However, the essential point for this study is that they
allowed some sense of rhythm to be maintained in some parts of the defence industry,
which enabled it to avoid some of the symptoms of economic crisis as well as the
destructive phenomena associated with it. So, the export of arms became an essential
element that has influenced the economic situation of part of the defence industry, and
therefore its restructuring ability.
Exports client by client (countries)
Sub-Saharan Africa. Russian exports to sub-Saharan countries are highly concentrated
in a few countries. First and most important is Angola, which is a traditional client
country and orders armoured vehicles, as well as aeroplanes. Then there is Ethiopia,
which has increased its purchases of Russian arms, particularly of aeroplanes and
helicopters. Furthermore, Eritrea began to purchase a relatively significant amount of
Russian imports during the second half of the 1990s. Nevertheless, one of the basic
characteristics of the Russian exports to this geographical area is that the arms have
practically all come from old Russian army stock.
Latin America and the Caribbean. Although exports were initially modest, this
market opened up in the second half of the 1990s. The first exports were in the field
of cargo aviation, and especially of helicopters. Only in a few cases has Russia
managed to sell light military equipment (portable missiles) and some planes. Brazil,
Colombia, Mexico and Peru are the countries from this area which have completed
the most important business deals with Russia.
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NATO countries in Europe and the USA. The only NATO country to which Russia
has managed to sell arms has been Greece and here the sales have mainly been of
anti-air defence systems. On the other hand a number of examples of collaboration
between Russia and France can be observed, and although for the moment these have
not produced the expected positive results, they could represent a mechanism for
generating some new exports in the future.
Non-NATO European countries. The non-NATO European countries are one of the
markets where Russia has lost most ground.10 In fact, it is only necessary to look at
the downward trend in the volume of this geographical area’s purchases, which
practically stopped completely at the end of the 1990s. Not only can we find countries
such as the Czech Republic, Croatia, Hungary or Poland here but also Romania and
Slovakia. Bulgaria is a different case, as here Russia has maintained part of its
influence, although it must be pointed out that the country’s economic conditions limit
its purchasing ability. On the other hand, Russia has kept up some relations with
Finland and has substantially increased its exports to Cyprus (particularly tanks and
anti-air systems)
Ex-Soviet republics. The break-up of the USSR brought about substantial changes in
relations among the old republics of which it was composed.11 As regards Russia, it
can be separated into four sub-areas. First, the Baltic area consolidated its orientation
towards the West, with the exception of Lithuania, which completed some purchases
from Russia to begin with but subsequently stopped. This area, therefore, with only
a limited need to purchase arms, is outside Russian influence. Second, the old
European Soviet republics (Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine) have stopped purchasing
from Russia. In Moldova’s case its reduced size has turned out to be a determining
factor in the cessation of orders. Belarus and Ukraine have kept their old Soviet
weapons and, in some cases, have tried to compete with Russia in some arms markets,
either by selling old army weapons or by being able to produce some weapons
systems. Third, the Caucasus area has cut itself off from Russia, with Armenia being
the only exception, as it has made some purchases from Russia, albeit a small
amount.12 Fourth, the old Central Asian republics have not all responded in the same
way. Tajikistan has been at war and the economic conditions prevalent have stopped
it from placing any real arms orders. Furthermore, the country is effectively a Russian
protectorate and so any purchasing of arms is irrelevant. Kyrgyzstan and Turk-
menistan have frozen their arms purchases, whereas Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan have
carried on buying, especially aeroplanes and armoured vehicles.
Far East. The Far East represents one of the most important geographical areas for
Russia as far as arms exports are concerned.13 During the 1990s two countries became
key destinations for Russian arms exports: China and India.14 Furthermore, they will
maintain this privileged position in the future thanks to the signing of agreements on
long-term military collaboration between both countries and Russia which cover the
sale of a wide range of weapons. Second, there is a group of countries of some
importance for Russian arms exports, which includes Bangladesh, Indonesia,
Malaysia and Vietnam, whose purchases are basically made up of transport
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helicopters and aeroplanes. The two Koreas meanwhile are special cases. First, it must
be noted that, while Russian exports to North Korea have been paralysed, South
Korea has made more arms purchases from Russia. This is to say that Russia has
gained access to a country whose arms supply was dominated by the USA and NATO
countries. However, it must be pointed out that South Korea signed the nucleus of the
Russian arms purchasing contracts in 1995 and serious doubt therefore exists about
Russia’s expansion into this market. Third, there is a group of countries which have
placed some Russian arms orders. On one hand there are the cases of the Philippines,
Sri Lanka and Singapore, who are customers but only on a small scale. On the other
hand there are countries which have made some strictly sporadic purchases from
Russia, such as Cambodia and especially Laos and Burma, which have limited their
purchases to transport helicopters—thereby taking advantage of the good prices
offered by the Russians. Together with these last countries, we have the case of
Pakistan, which also made a similar purchase but is clearly not a client of Russia.
The Middle East and North Africa. During the 1990s this area represented an
important market for Russia. Throughout the first half of the decade there was an
important volume of sales to Iran15 but these stopped after 1995 as a result of the
signing of an agreement between Russia and the USA to limit that country’s military
potential. However, owing to the revoking of this agreement, in the future Iran may
become a very dynamic client.16 On the other hand, Russia has strengthened its
commercial position in countries such as Algeria, Egypt and Syria, where it has
exported arms quite frequently. The United Arab Emirates may be included in this
group during the 1990s, not only for the volume but also the rhythm of its purchases,
as at that time it was equipping its infantry. Yemen, which on the other hand bought
no Russian armaments during the 1990s, placed some very important orders for tanks
and aeroplanes in 2000. Sales to Kuwait and Turkey have been negligible.
Exports product by product
Aviation. Traditionally, the outstanding export from this area has been the MiG-29
interceptor, and indeed 97 aeroplanes were sold in 1992–99. However, in the second
half of the decade sales slowed and it is only after 1998 that several more contracts
have been completed (a total of 11 aeroplanes), although it is likely that some of these
came from the Russian army. This trend is in total contrast to what has happened to
the Su-type aeroplanes. Several lots of Su-27 interceptor aeroplanes were sold
throughout the 1990s and in the second half of the decade two more contracts for sale
of Su-30 MK aeroplanes to India (40 units) and to China (30 units) were completed.
Second, and not so important, are exports of type An-32 Cline transport aeroplanes.
The export of helicopters merits special attention. Sales of the Mi-8 transport
helicopter or its modernised versions Mi-17 and Mi-171 (this being a civilian
helicopter) have been massive (97, 168 and 62 aircraft respectively). The export of a
dozen Mi-26 heavy transport helicopters or the light version Mi-34 should also be
noted, as should the sale of several Mi-24 attack helicopters. Together with these, ten
Ka-27 anti-submarine helicopters have been exported, as has its modernised version,
the Ka-31 (36 helicopters).
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Naval equipment. Here we can note not only the sale of Sovremennyi type destroyers,
project 1135.6 frigates or Tarantul-1 class corvettes but also supplementary equipment
for ships, for example guns and missile systems, as well as fire control and
surveillance radars. This type of equipment is included in the ships sold but can also
be sold on its own to place on craft already in service (to modernise them) or can be
built in other countries, as is the case with that supplied to India. Likewise, the recent
sale to Greece of Zubr type ships (also known as Pomornik) used to transport infantry
troops, as well as the export of Kilo type diesel propulsion submarines (nine during
the period under consideration), are important and should be noted.17
Anti-air systems and artillery. As regards anti-air systems, missile systems such as the
S-300PMU1 (SA-10 according to NATO nomenclature) have been exported, but what
stands out in this group is the sale of Tor-M1 short-distance missile systems (SA-15)
sold to Greece, Cyprus and China. Several armoured vehicles with incorporated
anti-air systems, such as the Tunguska or Pantsir, have been sold, as have some
BM-23 300 mm Smerch rocket systems or some mobile artillery (such as the 2S3
Nona). Exports of light artillery, either land-to-air such as the Igla-1 (SA-16) or the
Strela-2 (SA-7) or anti-tank such as the Kornet-E (AT-14), are also significant.
Armoured vehicles. During the first half of the 1990s sales of the T-72 tank were
important (472 units). At the same time the T-80 began to be exported (a total of 283
vehicles), after the Americans and British bought several of them for observation.
This type of last-generation tank, however, has given way to sales of the T-90 (124
units sold to India). The sale of armoured infantry transport vehicles should also be
noted, and of these, the BTR (vehicles with 88 wheels) and BMP (with a chassis
equipped with a caterpillar track) are worth mentioning.
Ammunition. As far as sales of ammunition are concerned, the air-to-air missiles, such
as the short-distance AA-8 Aphid at the beginning of the 1990s and the AA-11 Archer
in the second half of the decade, are the most important, but the medium-range AA-10
Alamo and in some cases the AA-12 Adder are also regularly sold. Air-to-land AS-17
Kripton missiles have also been exported, albeit more sporadically, incorporated in
aeroplanes’ equipment, and indeed the widespread sale of this type of ammunition is
linked to the export of Russian aeroplanes. The export of portable anti-air missiles
(SA-16 Gimlet, SA-18 Grouse or SA-19 Grison) as well as anti-tank missiles (AT-4
Spigot, AT-6 Spiral, AT-7 Saxhorn, AT-10 Bastion or AT-11 Sniper) is also
important. Lastly, the sale of sea-to-sea and sea-to-air missiles placed on ships, as
well as torpedoes for the submarines sold, must be mentioned.
Arms export policy
From the previous analysis, a list of the most important weapons exported by Russia
between 1992 and 2000 can be drawn up. Each weapons system can be associated
with one or two organisations which are production leaders, and the identification of
such organisations reveals that some 60 companies export items related to weapons
construction at what can be considered an important level (see Table 2). These
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companies control the financial flows linked to payment for the production of
weapons for export and establish how the sub-contracts are distributed. In this study
only this type of company will be considered a leader, except for those cases in which
sub-systems have been sold directly by the sub-contractor (as is the case in the sale
to India of equipment used to modernise ships), as these cases work in a different
way. It must be pointed out that, even taking into account the main sub-contractors
for each of the weapons systems, a large part of the nearly 1,700 companies which,
according to official sources, make up the military industrial sector never benefit from
exports: weapons exports affect a relatively small part of the Russian defence
industry.
The list obtained shows up the main defence organisations which exported from
1992 to 2000. During this period, however, economic policy on weapons exports
changed. From 1992 to 1997 the Russian defence industry was run by an administrat-
ive structure that was directly inherited from Soviet institutions,18 and during these
years its administrative status was steadily raised until it became a ministry (Min-
oboronprom) in 1996. In March 1997, however, this ministry was wound up and its
responsibilities taken over by the Ministry of Economic Affairs. On the other hand,
weapons exporting has been subject to a specific administrative structure. The
differing superior managing bodies have undergone changes since 1992, but
Rosvooruzhenie, as a state monopoly dedicated to the exporting of weapons, has
remained unchanged throughout nearly the whole period. There are two factors,
though, which have limited the Rosvooruzhenie monopoly: first, the legal authority of
a few companies to export weapons and, second, the creation in 1997 of Promeksport
(specialised in the sale of old Russian army weapons) and Rossiiskie tekhnologii
(directed at exporting military technology).19 It must be pointed out that in 1997 the
Ministry of Economic Affairs increased its ability to influence the exporting of
weapons, albeit working in combination with other administrative bodies.20 Thus in
1997 there was an important change in the administration of the defence industry and
in the export of weapons, which altered the focus of the policies applied in these
areas.
From 1998 onwards a new way of focusing on the reforms in the defence industry
has come into practice. The fundamental idea behind this reform consists of substan-
tially reducing the size of the industry (by expelling organisations from the sector),
together with a change to the internal structure (the creation of internally integrated
business associations).21 As to the policy on the exporting of weapons, there has been
a tendency to concentrate external orders in a smaller number of companies and,
particularly, to assign orders to only one company from all those that could complete
them. This behavioural change appears linked to the programme explicitly launched
by the government, although it is not unreasonable to suppose it has been brought on
by the declining production level of defence organisations during the first years of the
transition.22 Additionally, given the financial restrictions, the policy outlined in the
1998 programme has been put into practice in accordance with such limitations and
on the quiet, that is to say without being made public, owing to the conflict between
opposing interests generated in the industrial network.
Therefore, between the beginning and the end of the 1990s there was a change in
the assignation of export-based production when substitute products were concerned,
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so that it was only one company that took on responsibility for production. For this
reason the list in Table 2 would be much shorter if compiled at the end of the 1990s.
There are several examples illustrating this tendency to concentrate orders. First, in
the area of aviation, fighter planes are one of the most important sales. From 1992 to
1997 export orders were distributed between MiG-29 light interceptors, produced by
the RSK MiG group, and the heavy Su-27 ones, made by the AVPK
Sukhoi group. Between 1998 and 2000 sales of the first type fell substantially,
whereas those of the second remained steady, at the same time as the promotion of
the Su-30 type aeroplane led to greater sales of these. This points to the fact that there
was a clear tendency in the second half of the 1990s to concentrate foreign sales
around the Su models at the cost of the traditional MiG and, as a result, to support
one industrial group over another.23
As regards transport helicopters, there are two companies sharing the market and
whose production is similar, the Kazanskoe vertoletnoe PO (Kazan’) and the Ulan-
udenskoe aviatsionnoe PO (Ulan Ude). Both used to produce Mi-8 helicopters;
however, the first company has specialised in constructing its modernised, more
military version, the Mi-17, while the second is specialising in making a more
modern, civilian model, the Mi-171.24 It must be pointed out that foreign demand
gives a certain dynamic rhythm to both companies, although it is possible that orders
could be concentrated in one company only. As the Kazan’ plant has the capacity to
produce all the Mi types of transport helicopter and as its military line is more
developed, the Ulan-Ude factory could possibly be removed from the defence
industry.25
At the beginning of the 1990s attack aeroplanes were equipped with short-range
AA-8 Aphid air-to-air missiles, produced by NPO Molniya (Moscow), and
AA-11 Archer ones, made by MKB Vimpel (Moscow). During the second half
of the decade foreign sales of air-to-air missiles were concentrated around the second
type. It must be pointed out that NPO Molniya is a factory specialised in space
equipment and where only one active missile production line was maintained, the one
corresponding to the previously mentioned AA-8 Aphid.26 The MKB Vimpel
organisation, however, is fully specialised in the design and construction of air-to-air
missiles of differing ranges.27 Therefore, at the end of the 1990s exports were
concentrated in MKB Vimpel at the expense of NPOMolniya . There is
also a production overlap in the MKBFakel (Khimki, Moscow region) and
MKBNovator (Ekaterinburg) design centres, as both are specialised in land-to-
air and sea-to-air missiles.28 Nevertheless, while the first centre has maintained a
regular level of exports during the 1990s, and has even improved from 1998 onwards,
OKB Novator has had a more modest export record. The use of missiles
depends on the type of anti-air system used and there is not only support for
producing systems whose missiles are made by MKBFakel but also a tendency
towards homogenisation whereby one missile can be used in several systems. This
means that OKBNovator is in a more delicate situation and its survival could be
called into question.29
Another area of production overlap is that of the design and production of anti-ship
missiles (air-to-ship and ship-to-ship). In this area GNPTS Zvezda-Strela (Ko-
rolev, Moscow region), specialised in the production of air-to-surface missiles,
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exports the SS-N-25 missile,30 while the NPOMashinostroeniya company
(Reutov, Moscow region), specialised in the production of artificial satellites, heavy
and strategic missiles as well as torpedoes, constructs the anti-ship Yakhont and Al’fa
missiles to be exported.31 In third place there is MKB Raduga (Dubna, Moscow
region), specialised in air-to-surface missiles and producing the SS-N-22 (Moskit).32
Additionally, some of these centres’ other production lines overlap with those of OKB
Novator , and indeed some of their current products and production development
lines do so noticeably. Given the country’s economic situation, it is impractical to
keep up all these centres and it is likely that export policy will concentrate production
for foreign orders in only some of these centres. It must be pointed out that any
decision making by the Russian authorities in this area is difficult owing to this type
of company’s high level of specialisation, the comparatively notable technical
progress (notable in relation even to NATO member countries) and the great power
enjoyed by the production centres.33
As to the export of armoured vehicles, only two of the different models produced
in Russia have been sold since the beginning of the transition period: the BMP (with
caterpillar tracks) and the BTR (wheeled). One important case is that of armoured
vehicles with caterpillar track used for transporting infantry, and particularly the fact
that sales of the BMD produced in the Volgogradskii traktornyi zavod (Volgograd)
have been displaced, so that although such models are still offered, this seems to be
a mere formality.34 The sales of this type of vehicle have been concentrated in the
Kurganskii mashinostroitel’nyi zavod (Kurgan) factory where the BMP are made.35
There appears to have been a decision, therefore, to promote sales of the BMP only,
to the detriment of the BMD. Tanks are another important export line and two
factories have covered export orders since 1992. On one hand there is Uralvagonza-
vod (Nizhnii Tagil, Sverdlovsk region), producer of the T-72 and the T-90, and on the
other there is Omskii zavod transportnogo mashinostroeniya (Omsk), which made the
T-80. Up to 1996–97 the industrial policy pursued was characterised by the sharing
out of orders between both companies, but from that time on there has been a
substantial change in that exports have been concentrated in the first factory, to the
cost of the second, which has lost its orders.36 This situation has been made quite clear
with the repeated offers of the T-90 tank by Rosvooruzhenie, which have ended in the
sale of an important batch of these tanks to India.37
The fleet, and specifically the production of submarines, provides an example of the
change in export policy. Up to 1996 orders for diesel-powered submarines were
assigned either to Admiralteiskie verfi (Saint Petersburg) or to Krasnoe sormovo
(Nizhny Novgorod). From that year on foreign orders have been covered only by the
former. Problems also arise in the area of military ships.38 First, exports of small ships
have been concentrated among a very reduced number of companies.39 Of the three
that have sold to foreign countries, Zelenodol’skii sudostroitel’nyi zavod im. A.M.
Gor’kogo (Zelenodol’sk, Tatarstan)40 has lost export orders and, as to the other two
exporters, Sudostroitel’nyi zavod Vimpel (Rybinsk, Yaroslavl’ region) and
Sudostroitel’naya firma Almaz (Saint Petersburg), it seems that exports of small
ships (motorboats and patrol boats) will be concentrated in the first of these in the
future.41 Second, as regards large ships, there were three traditional shipbuilders:
Zavod Yantar (Kaliningrad), Baltiiskii zavod (Saint Petersburg) and Severnaya
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verf’ (Saint Petersburg). However, in 1997, when foreign demand began, the first of
these three companies was excluded from any military exports.42
One of the defence industry’s most important restructuring lines is the tendency to
concentrate foreign orders in the organisations which deal with domestic weapons
orders. Indeed, this concentration of military orders deprives organisations of their
status as members of the defence industry.43 In this way, the burden of arms
production will fall more heavily on the organisations which are members of the
defence industry, but the financing will come not only from domestic sources but also
from the export of weapons. Although with this latter method of financing the
financial flow may be indirect (as the business administration is carried out through
an intermediary state company such as Rosvooruzhenie or Rosoboroneksport and the
revenue gained from exports is initially included in the state budget), organisations
involved in exporting arms will nonetheless receive financial resources to enable them
to complete the orders and thus sustain part of their output, if the aim is to maintain
the capacity to export.
Given the relative scarcity of domestic financing, the inflows resulting from exports
are essential for the organisations’ survival.44 It seems likely that a restructuring
policy which uses domestic finances to back those high-priority armament pro-
grammes that cannot receive foreign financing (for example, nuclear missiles)
will be pursued. Likewise, those organisations that develop high-priority programmes
that do have the capacity to export may receive state financing. However, for these
last programmes (and organisations), as well as for those of medium or low-level
priority, the financial flows resulting from exports will be important. Indeed, those
organisations whose production is only of medium or low-level priority will not be
able to survive if they do not export. It is likely, furthermore, that arms producers of
medium or low-level priority for the state and with the capacity to export will oust
those with no possibility of selling on the foreign market from the scale of
government priorities.
Domestic priorities, therefore, seem to be conditioned by exports, either at the
moment of choosing between alternative weapons systems or by eliminating arma-
ments which do not have sufficient financial backing, and to this end it is useful to
point to two conditioning factors that limit internal decision making. First, weapons
systems may be developed to order and then adopted by the Russian army itself. Such
is the case with the development of modernised versions of the Su-30 aeroplane, but
the Su-34 development programme may be stopped. Second, Russia may collaborate
in the development of other countries’ weapons systems, later to incorporate them
into the Russian army. There are several cases of just such collaboration,45 but one
successful example has been that begun in 1998 between NPO Mashino-
stroeniya and an Indian company to modernise the SS-NX-26 (Yakhont) shipboard
missile, which seemingly will result in missile production for Russia as well as
India.46 In both cases part of the definitive shape of the defence industry seems to be
conditioned by foreign needs, at the same time as there has been a change in the
traditional Soviet aim of being at the forefront of the armaments field, which has
developed into the conception of shared military technology.
On the other hand, it must be underlined that the exclusion of organisations,
particularly those of low priority for the state, will not be immediate, especially when
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they have a genuine export capacity. This is to say that, in this case, a contradiction
between domestic and foreign priorities would arise. In this type of situation the
organisations may be permitted to engage in foreign collaboration or exports and, if
the company survives, its position within the defence industry would subsequently be
reconsidered.
What is clear is that one of the most important lines in the industry’s restructuring
policy is that of concentrating orders, particularly export orders, in one group of
weapons systems and the cessation of orders for other similar ones. That means that
any duplication in arms production is being avoided. The advantage of this policy
revolves around the fact that, although there is less variety of production, the
country’s defensive capacity is not reduced. However, it means paralysing the
production of an important number of organisations, not only of those responsible for
the production of the weapons system as a whole but also the different sub-contracted
companies. Therefore, this policy is becoming a very powerful tool in the restructur-
ing of the defence industry, as it leads to the exclusion of a significant number of
production organisations.
Nevertheless, in the current situation there are several factors that may limit the
contribution of exports to the restructuring of the defence industry. First, there
is the fact that most of the financing derived from exports is lost in the state
intermediaries and the state budget, so that the producers themselves are left
without financing. Second, there is the rivalry that exists in the army over the
resources linked to arms exports, either because the funds resulting from exports
go towards reorganising the army or because the sale of weapons from old army
stock is promoted instead of new production. Third, export reorganisation partly
depends on decisions made by the central authorities but influenced by the defence
organisations themselves.47 On one hand, pressure from below may change
state policy on the defence industry’s restructuring and, on the other hand,
it may bring about confrontations between business groups which, if they go
on for any length of time, could be very destructive for the groups in
question. Among the most recent business conflicts has been one caused by
TsKB Almaz design centre, which was one of the most important centres
in the GFI Oboronitel’nye sistemy group, which had been designated
by the Russian authorities as the leading group in the construction of anti-air
systems. Recently the design centre has left the group, thus calling the
group’s existence into question, and has joined its main competitor, Kontsern
Antei , creating the new industrial group Almaz-Antei .48 Another
example of this conflict is the confrontation between the large-scale ship
builders Baltiisky zavod and Severnaya verf’. The latter is beginning to receive state
orders for ships and, therefore, is becoming the essential company in the defence
industry in this field. At the end of 2001 and beginning of 2002 a dispute arose over
the assignation of an order for two destroyers to be exported to China,49 which would
result in Severnaya verf’ being consolidated as leader in this area of the defence
industry. This is the reason why the conflict between the two companies has become
markedly more serious and may alter the initial decisions taken by the Russian
authorities.
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Conclusions
1992 saw the start of a very important reduction in the defence industry’s
level of military output. This was due to the fall not only in domestic armaments
demand but also in the volume of exports. The reduction in both types of demand
has given exports a strategic value in the maintenance of economic activity in
part of the defence industry. Those organisations that have managed to export
have become the industry’s most dynamic focal points, due to the fact that
such production has meant that the effects of the decline in output have been
softened. After nearly ten years, the Russian defence industry’s production
capacity is in very bad health, but the situation in those companies most closely
connected to exporting is better. This is the reason why such companies form an
essential part of the nucleus of the future defence industry and what they produce
(type of weapons built) is the basis of future production, even that used to meet
domestic needs. Therefore, weapons exports represent an economic restriction that
will condition the make-up of the future military priorities and the restructuring of the
defence industry.
As a consequence of the change in how exports and the defence industry are
organised, two time periods can be distinguished on the basis of the policy put into
practice. During the first, 1992–97, the policy in place was one conditioned by the
Soviet inheritance and characterised by the distributing of foreign orders among
several of the companies able to meet them. As a result, exports did not become a
mechanism for slowing down the fall in output suffered by the defence companies.
From 1997 onwards, in spite of the fact that there has been no explicitly stated export
policy, a certain regularity in the behaviour of the Russian authorities (export policy
carried out in practice) has been revealed simply by observing the facts. To be
specific, the tendency arose to concentrate export orders in only one of the possible
producing companies. This policy is a very controversial one and, therefore, has been
put into practice de facto but not de iure, which is to say there has been no explicit
statement.
The motivation for the export policy is a evidently a combination of political
decisions and economics factors. When multiple producers of a similar type of
weapon exist, one of the producers is selected; however, in cases when external
demand has been concentrated on a type of weapon, this economic factor conditions
the political decision. In cases where there are both product differentiation and a
certain external demand, the political decision is postponed, as shown in Table 2
(political priority column).
Therefore, the companies in which export orders are being concentrated will go on
to constitute one of the most important pillars of the future Russian defence industry.
Furthermore, their products will be the basis on which domestic needs are covered
and some of the most important Russian arms development programmes are estab-
lished. The policy of weapons exports has thus been used as an economic tool to
restructure the defence industry and, in the future, it seems that it will play a much
more dynamic role in this regard.
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